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Abstract
Wireless data demands keep rising at a fast rate. In 2016, Cisco measured a global mobile data traffic volume of 7.2
Exabytes per month and projected a growth to 49 Exabytes per month in 2021. Wi-Fi plays an important role in
this as well. Up to 60% of the total mobile traffic was off-loaded via Wi-Fi (and femtocells) in 2016. This is further
expected to increase to 63% in 2021. In this publication, we look into the roll-out of public Wi-Fi networks, public
meaning in a public or semi-public place (pubs, restaurants, sport stadiums, etc.). More concretely we look into the
collaboration between two parties, a technical party and a venue owner, for the roll-out of a new Wi-Fi network.
The technical party is interested in reducing load on its mobile network and generating additional direct revenues,
while the venue owner wants to improve the attractiveness of the venue and consequentially generate additional
indirect revenues. Three Wi-Fi pricing models are considered: entirely free, slow access with ads or fast access via
paid access (freemium), and paid access only (premium). The technical party prefers a premium model with high
direct revenues, the venue owner a free/freemium model which is attractive to its customers, meaning both parties
have conflicting interests. This conflict has been modeled using non-cooperative game theory incorporating
detailed cost and revenue models for all three Wi-Fi pricing models. The initial outcome of the game is a premium
Wi-Fi network, which is not the optimal solution from an outsider’s perspective as a freemium network yields
highest total payoffs. By introducing an additional compensation scheme which corresponds with negotiation in
real life, the outcome of the game is steered toward a freemium solution.
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1 Introduction and definition of public Wi-Fi
Wireless data demands keep rising at a fast rate; in 2016,
Cisco measured a global mobile data traffic volume of
7.2 Exabytes per month and projected a growth to 49
Exabytes per month in 2021. The upcoming 5G standard
is expected to further support this constant increase in
wireless data demands. Wi-Fi plays an important role as
well: up to 60% of the total mobile traffic was off-loaded
via Wi-Fi (and femtocells) in 2016 and this proportion is
expected to rise to 63% in 2021 [1]. These Wi-Fi net-
works will also play an important role in the evolution
toward smart cities by connecting large amounts of sen-
sors supporting new services (e.g., dynamic monitoring
of waste bins).
In this publication, we will focus on public Wi-Fi net-
works. For the remainder of this publication, we will
define a public Wi-Fi network as a wireless network that
is offered to visitors of a public or semi-public place.
This definition covers all sizes of networks, ranging from
a coffee house with a single access point (AP) to large
networks covering museums, sports stadiums, or even
entire cities. We do differentiate, however, between the
typical customer-facing Wi-Fi networks which are typic-
ally found in individual shops and shopping malls, and
municipal Wi-Fi networks which are offered by local
government to stimulate local businesses and tourism.
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At this point in time, customer-facing Wi-Fi is typic-
ally free, as business owners expect their Wi-Fi network
to generate sufficient indirect revenue (e.g., by attracting
additional customers or by making people stay longer)
to weigh up to the costs of deploying the network.
That is not the case for city-wide municipal networks.
Offering free municipal Wi-Fi has a large range of eco-
nomic benefits, such as alleviating the digital divide [2] and
making the region attractive to businesses and highly
educated citizens [3]. However, it is unclear whether the
indirect benefits of such an endeavor outweigh the costs of
setting up and operating a city-wide free Wi-Fi network.
For this reason, this publication does not assume public
Wi-Fi to necessarily be free for the user. We consider two
additional Wi-Fi business models in which, aside from in-
direct revenues, direct revenues are generated as well. In
the freemium model, a user is given the choice to either
surf at a limited speed and be shown ads (e.g., injecting an
additional header or footer in the visited websites is a typ-
ical approach) or to pay for a faster adless connection. Al-
ternatively, using the premium model, users are obligated
to pay to get access (though no ads are shown).
Looking at the practical side of Wi-Fi network deploy-
ments, multiple parties can be involved: the actor who
wants a Wi-Fi network in its venue might pay a second
party to perform all technical duties (deployment and
maintenance). For example, a small coffee shop might
pay a local technician to deploy its network; a city
government may depend on the technical expertise of a
mobile network operator (MNO) to deploy the network
or may even choose to set up long-term collaboration
such as a public-private partnership (PPP).
In this paper, we demonstrate how non-cooperative
game theory can be used to model the interaction be-
tween a technical party (e.g., a wireless network oper-
ator) and the owner of a public or semi-public venue
when considering the joint deployment of public Wi-Fi.
We look into how the relevant network costs (upfront
and deployment) and revenues (both direct and indirect)
can be modeled for the different pricing models (free,
freemium, and premium) and how these costs and
revenues can be split between both parties. Finally, we
also introduce means of steering the expected outcome
of the game in order to end up in the most beneficial
outcome possible for all parties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
in section 2, we provide an overview of the existing lit-
erature on public Wi-Fi in general, as well as a literature
review on non-cooperative games in the context of ICT
networks and telecommunications. In section 3, we sug-
gest a methodology for modeling the costs and revenues
associated with public Wi-Fi deployment and the game
theoretical interplay between the technical party and the
venue owner. Section 4 applies this methodology to a
public Wi-Fi deployment in a shopping mall and dis-
cusses the potential implications on real-life public Wi-
Fi projects. In section 5, we give some concluding
remarks and propose trajectories for future work.
2 Literature study and background information
In this section, we discuss the current state of the art di-
vided in two major sections. The first section (2.1) gives
more detail about public Wi-Fi in general. The second
section (2.2) focuses upon the game theoretical part and
provides the required background for the remainder of
the paper. It provides a set of examples in which game
theory has been used in both a broader scope of ICT net-
works as well as for (public) Wi-Fi networks specifically.
2.1 Public Wi-Fi examples
While in the early days of customer-facing Wi-Fi, users
often had to pay a subscription fee or watch advertise-
ments to gain access to the network, free Wi-Fi in small
and medium-sized businesses has been a successful busi-
ness model for the past decade. Typically, venues with
customer-facing Wi-Fi are privately owned. We do how-
ever refer to these as public networks, since they are lo-
cated in semi-public places such as pubs, restaurants,
and business venues [4]. Public does not mean un-
secured; typically, access keys are shared on-site. This
way, the network can mostly be limited to customers
who are actually present at the venue, if the key is chan-
ged frequently enough.1
While customer-facing networks are quite common,
city-wide municipal Wi-Fi networks are less so. Munici-
pal Wi-Fi offers a wide range of social and economic
benefits such as cost savings in public offices, providing
a stimulus to the economy and alleviating the digital div-
ide [5]. Many of these networks had to shut down, how-
ever, as they were not economically viable [6].
Next to economic reasons, municipal Wi-Fi offers run
into other problems. By offering free or cheap Internet
access to inhabitants, local governments enter the highly
competitive telecommunications market at ultra-low
prices or free of charge. This has even led to municipal-
ities being sued by private Internet Service Providers
(ISP) over loss of profit [2, 7].
In order to tackle both of these problems at once, we
consider non-free municipal Wi-Fi networks which are
being rolled out in cooperation with a MNO. As users
also generate direct revenues (next to the earlier dis-
cussed indirect revenues), the cost of the network can
(partly) be covered. In the meantime, the MNO can
1Adding a security key (e.g., using WPA2) also allows the encryption
of all traffic. The impact of this should not be overrated: a possible
attacker might still be able to listen in on any plain-text traffic as the
security key is publicly known.
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benefit from the cooperation instead of suffering from
the added competition.
The European Commission (EC) clearly also believes
in the indirect economic gains of public Wi-Fi. In 2016,
the EC has decided upon the WiFi4EU scheme, which
frees up a total of 120 million between 2017 and 2019 to
support the roll-out of public Wi-Fi in public spaces
such as parks, squares, and public buildings where a free
public or a private Wi-Fi hotspot offering does not
already exist [8].
2.2 Introduction to game theory and non-cooperative
games
In the previous section, we provided some additional
background about public Wi-Fi networks. This section
will do the same for the game theoretical approach used
in this publication.
Game theory is the mathematical modeling of both co-
operative and non-cooperative scenarios, so-called games.
From a high-level point of view, game theory can be split
in two categories: cooperative and non-cooperative games.
In cooperative games, an analysis is made of how a set of
actors can work together most optimally by creating a co-
alition. In this type of game, the different players will (as
the name indicates) cooperate to a common goal.
Next to cooperative games, there are non-cooperative
games in which the impact of (market) competition or
conflicting objectives is modeled. In this publication, we
focus on parallel non-cooperative two-player games. In
these games, both players choose their strategy at the same
time without knowledge of the chosen strategy of the other
actor. Aside from parallel games, there are sequential
games. In sequential games actors choose one after the
other, taking into account what its opponent has chosen.
Sequential games are not further used in this publication.
In non-cooperative games, each combination of strat-
egies (meaning each player has chosen one of its strat-
egies) results in a numerical value for each of the players,
the so-called payoff values. Two kinds of games exist:
zero-sum games and non-zero-sum games. In a zero-sum
game, the sum of the payoffs of both players is equal to
zero for each combination of strategies. An outcome for
player 1 of plus five will thus have an outcome for player 2
of minus five. Non-zero-sum games are thus games in
which the sum of the payoffs is not equal to zero.
How the payoffs are constructed can vary from simple
predefined intuitively chosen values to complex math-
ematical models to which the chosen strategies are the
inputs. Payoff values should be modeled carefully, as the
outcome of a game theoretical approach depends on
them. In the next section, we look more deeply into
what makes game theoretical analysis so interesting and
how games can be represented using one of the most
typical examples (the prisoner’s dilemma). Afterwards, a
number of examples are provided in which game theory
has been used in both a broader scope of ICT networks
as well as for Wi-Fi networks in particular.
2.3 Analysis of non-cooperative games
Non-cooperative game theory allows for the identification
of dominant strategies (strategies that yield a better payoff
than any other, independently from the strategies of the
other players), Nash equilibria (combinations of strategies
where no one player can gain a higher payoff by choosing
a different strategy), and Pareto efficient states (combina-
tions of strategies where no player can gain a higher payoff
without decreasing any other player’s payoff).
Non-cooperative games often end up in a Nash equi-
librium which is not a Pareto optimal state, as one or
more parties have an incentive to cheat the other(s) by
deviating from the Pareto optimal solution. An example
for this is the prisoner’s dilemma [9] which has a single
Nash equilibrium and three Pareto optimal states, none
of which equal the Nash equilibrium.
The prisoner’s dilemma goes like this: suppose that two
partners in crime are independently being questioned by
the police (meaning they have no means of communicat-
ing with each other). They both have the option to either
cooperate (confess) or to remain silent. If they both refuse
to cooperate (and thus remain silent), they will both be
sentenced with a short jail-time (1 year), lacking sufficient
evidence for more severe punishments. If they both co-
operate, they both will be sentenced to a medium-length
prison sentence (8 years). If one remains silence, and the
other cooperates, the one cooperating walks free because
of good behavior, while the other one receives the full
blame and as result a maximum sentence (10 years).
Table 1 shows the typical representation of the out-
come of a two-player non-cooperative game; this
outcome is called a payoff matrix. The row headers rep-
resent the actions of the first player (in this case the first
prisoner, P1), and the column headers the representation
of the second player (P2). Each cell contains the payoffs
of both players, first the payoff of the first player,
followed by the second. Additionally, specific cells can
be indicated on the matrix to indicate Nash and Pareto
equilibria. In this case, there is only one Nash equilib-
rium, indicating that both prisoners will cooperate (and
thus end up in prison for 8 years). This makes sense
since, not knowing whether the other one will confess or
not, it is always safer to confess and risk a medium-
length sentence than to remain silent and risk a long
sentence. This is a so-called dominant strategy. How-
ever, this outcome is not the most favorable situation for
both. If both had kept silent, they would have been free
after just a single year in jail [10].
This makes non-cooperative games very enticing for
economists, as it is possible to identify Pareto optimal
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game states, which usually indicates a game state that
provides the highest overall payoff. The goal then exists
to steer the game by adapting the strategies of one of
the players in such a way that one out of the set of out-
comes becomes both Nash and Pareto.
2.3.1 Game theoretical applied to ICT networks
Generally speaking, game theory has been applied for
the optimization of various back-end functions of ICT
networks such as resource allocation and routing opti-
mizations [11–13] but also for optimizing power usage
[14] as well as for spectrum sharing [15].
More concretely for Wi-Fi networks, non-cooperative
game theory has been used for various optimizations and
evaluations: e.g., for bandwidth sharing within a single Wi-
Fi network [16], for the selection of the optimal network
from a set of available Wi-Fi networks [17], for the creation
of pricing schemes in order to determine the optimal net-
work to connect to, either Wi-Fi or a competing network
(e.g., mobile, WiMax) [18–21], and for reducing mobile
volume usage by creating delayed offloading schemes and
smart caching via Wi-Fi networks [22–24].
Quite some publications can be found which use game
theory for the optimization of ICT networks and Wi-Fi
networks in general. The same cannot be said for litera-
ture for the game theoretical analysis of public Wi-Fi
networks specifically. Prior work discussed the fact that
a public-private partnership between the municipality
and a private network operator is a viable strategy for
public Wi-Fi deployment, but the chances of this hap-
pening diminish when competition is added [25]. Other
work describes a self-managed scheme that promotes
the formation of peer-to-peer free municipal Wi-Fi net-
works, by opening up underexploited wireless networks
[26]. In [27], a study was made to determine a strategic
access price (a ticket one has to buy in order to gain
access) for public Wi-Fi when offered by a local govern-
ment and how this is impacted by competition with
mobile networks. In [28], the entrance of a new mobile
virtual network operator (MVNO) is analyzed. The new
player can either lease network resources from an exist-
ing MNO or can fall back to existing Wi-Fi networks.
Using game theory, an optimal price setting has been de-
termined. A similar study was made in [29] in which
game theory was used to compare 3G mobile networks
with municipal Wi-Fi.
Finally, [30] discussed monetization of Wi-Fi networks
either using a freemium (free, though seeing ads) or pre-
mium model (paid access). This work focused upon the
interaction of multiple parties—a venue owner owning the
network, mobile users (MU), advertisers, and advertise-
ment platforms—and states that public Wi-Fi networks “…
are capable of generating large revenues through mainly
providing one type of Wi-Fi access (the premium access or
advertising sponsored access), depending on their advertis-
ing concentration levels and MU visiting frequencies.” Our
own publication has a clear link to this but focuses upon
the interaction of the venue owner and a mobile owner. In
contrast, [30] makes an abstraction of the mobile users and
the advertisement platforms. Instead, we focus upon the
different costs of different Wi-Fi pricing schemes. A free
network will attract more users than a pay-for-access net-
work and need thus be dimensioned accordingly. On top
of that, we also consider additional direct and indirect rev-
enue streams next to advertisements.
It is clear that only little work has been done to model
the interactions between a technical party and a venue
owner for the joint deployment of public Wi-Fi network.
These parties, while having a common goal, clearly also
have competing goals (each wanting maximal profit). In
this publication, we are applying non-cooperative game
theory to model exactly these interactions. While other
publications mainly apply game theory for the evaluation
of different wireless technologies, we are focusing upon
different pricing schemes for Wi-Fi networks (free, free-
mium, and premium). As a result, we are not focusing
upon the technical details but rather on the economic
side. For this, we have built detailed cost and revenue
models in order to estimate the relevant cash flows for
both actors, allowing us to make a well-founded game
theoretical analysis. Starting from the initial modeled
game, we introduce new strategies to steer the outcome
of both players to the most optimal solution.
3 Methods: modeling the payoff values for
cooperative Wi-Fi roll-out use cases
In the previous section, we have introduced what can be
learned from a game theoretical approach. Now, we will
Table 1 Payoff matrix of the prisoners’ dilemma upon which both Pareto optimal state (bordered cells) and the Nash equilibrium
(bold and underlined) are indicated
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look into how this can be applied to a cooperative Wi-Fi
roll-out. As mentioned in section 2.2, in order to con-
struct a payoff matrix, we first have to know which values
should be used as the payoff values and consequentially
how the payoff values should be modeled and how these
are impacted by the different strategies of the players.
For this, we define two players: a MNO and a venue
owner (VO). The MNO sees value in a Wi-Fi offer (e.g.,
for additional revenues or for reducing the load on the
mobile network). The VO wants to offer Wi-Fi services
to the users in the venue (e.g., a mall owner who wants
to attract more customers or a museum that wants to
improve the user experience). We have chosen these
actors because they are generically applicable and can
thus be reused for other use cases. The strategies of
these different actors however should be considered use
case specific. These will be discussed in section 4; for
now, we will focus upon the high-level structure of the
payoff values within the game matrix.
As payoff values, we have chosen the net cash flow
(i.e., the sum of all revenues minus the sum of all expen-
ditures) after a number of years of operation. In order to
do so, we require a detailed cost model for all relevant
costs, including capital expenditures (CapEx) and oper-
ational expenditures (OpEx), allowing the calculation of
the total cost of ownership (TCO) for the Wi-Fi network
in the use case at hand which is discussed in section 3.1.
Additionally, all direct and indirect revenue streams
should be modeled; these are discussed in section 3.2.
In order to make both the payoff of the MNO and the
VO dependent upon both the cost and revenues, we
have provided means of splitting these between the
players. For the remainder of this publication, we as-
sume the total cost of the Wi-Fi roll-out (both CapEx
and OpEx) is entirely covered by the network operator,
who also receives 100% of the direct revenue. The VO
receives the total indirect revenue. Choosing other cost
and revenue split values might be interesting to simulate
additional negotiation between both players and other
types of use cases (see section 5). Eqs. 1 and 2 show
these cost and revenue splits; the definition of the corre-
sponding parameters is given in Table 2.
PMNO ¼ DR 1−srð Þ−TCO 1−scð Þ ð1Þ
PVO ¼ IRþ DR  sr−TCO  sc ð2Þ
When actually creating the payoff matrix, it looks like
Table 3: the strategies of the MNO are the row headers,
the ones of the VO the column headers. Each payoff cell
contains 2 values, first the payoff of the MNO followed
by the payoff of the VO.
Now that the high-level structure of the payoff values
has been introduced, we will give model the values of the
parameters. Section 3.1 discussed how the TCO is calcu-
lated in, followed by the venue modeling in section 3.2.
3.1 Equipment cost modeling of Wi-Fi networks
In order to calculate the TCO of the Wi-Fi network, we
have started from a cost model and accompanying de-
tailed bill of materials (BOM) received from the French
mobile telecommunications operator Orange. In order
to reuse this model and convert it to be useful for the
use cases at hand, we categorized the items of the BOM
into access point (AP)-driven costs (cost that are directly
linked to the number of APs) and additional fixed costs
(any additional (network) equipment to get the Wi-Fi
network running) as shown in Table 4.
In the BOM, three parameters have been introduced
(Nap, Nswitch, and Ncable) which will be modeled next in
more detail. The first parameter is Nap which represents
the total number of required access points. This is based
upon the maximal number of users each AP needs to
and is able to handle as well as the area (in m2) that
needs to be covered combined with the percentage of
the area that should be covered (parameter o). A cover-
age factor of 80% (o = 0.8) would thus mean 80% of all
total area should be covered. The number of access
points needed is formulated as shown in equation Eq. 3;
the corresponding parameters are defined in Table 5.
The number of concurrent users and correspondingly
the number of APs is directly linked to the different pri-
cing models which will be discussed in section 4.2.
Nap ¼ max uuAP ;
a  o
aAP
 
ð3Þ
Once the total number of the access points is known,
we can also calculate the number of Power over Ethernet
(PoE) switches required (Nswitch), which is directly re-
lated to the number of APs as shown in Eq. 4. Using
PoE, the APs can be provided with electricity without
the need of an additional power cable. A minimum of 4
Table 2 High-level parameters used in the payoff functions of
the cooperative game
Parameter Explanation
PMNO Payoff mobile network operator
PVO Payoff venue owner
DR Total direct revenue
IR Total indirect revenue
TCO Total cost of ownership (CapEx + OpEx)
sr Revenue split [0–100%], default 0%
sc Cost split [0–100%], default 0%
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switches are always taken into account for redundancy
and for spreading the total traffic load from the APs.
N switch ¼ max 4;Nap24
 
ð4Þ
In section 4, the highest number of APs we are consid-
ering is 180, meaning 8 switches. We suppose the single
router (as defined in Table 4) has (a) sufficient ports to
connect all switches and (b) sufficient capacity to handle
all traffic.
The third and final parameter is Ncable which repre-
sents the total length (in meters) of network cable re-
quired to connect all APs. To do so, a basic cabling
scheme is proposed to estimate the total cable length,
using a small set of assumptions:
 The area to be covered is rectangular, with a width
of AreaW and a height of AreaH
 A n ·m grid with square cells (with side s) is layered
above the rectangular area and in each cell an AP
will be installed. The parameters n and m are
chosen in a way so that:
n ·m ≈Nap.
AreaL
n ≈ s
AreaH
m ≈ s
 Cells are indicated using a Cartesian coordinate
system starting in the top left with cell (0, 0). In the
Table 3 Exemplary payoff matrix of the cooperative game
Table 4 The reworked bill of materials (BOM) split in AP-driven costs fixed costs
Item CapEx OpEx Amount
AP-driven costs
Access points (AP) Nap
• Device €402 10%
• AP antenna €272
• Installation €955
• AP-switch connection €330
• Floor space and energy consumption €427
Site maintenance €735
PoE switch €1819 10% Nswitch
Switch-router connection €396 Nswitch
Ethernet cabling (m) €1 NCable
Subsystem installationa €210 Nswitch + 2
Electric cablinga €60 Nswitch + 2
Fixed costs
Controller €14,975 10% 1
Router €1819 10% 1
Rack 1
• Device €735 10%
• Installation €180
Technical support €2800 1
Uplink cost €1638.9 2
aInstallation/electric cabling of/for all switches + 1 controller and 1 router
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middle of each cell an AP is installed, meaning the
exact location of the AP in the first cell of this grid
is thus positioned at (0.5; 0.5) (the x’s in the
visualization).
 Switches are installed in 4 locations in the mall from
which cable ducts run to the router. These points
are chosen in order to minimize the total cable
length and are also installed in the middle of the
indicated cells (the cells with thick borders in the
visualization).
 APs are connected to the closest switch; cables only
make right angles.
Taking these assumptions into account, the proposed
grid looks like Table 6, the rectangle has been layered by
a 6 · 5 grid (n ·m). Now that this representation is made,
the cable length for each AP can easily be estimated,
using two basic steps (Eq. 5).
CS ¼ Closest switch point for AP
Length of cable ¼ CSx‐APxð Þsj j þ CSy‐APyÞs
 
ð5Þ
Using this approach, we have calculated the required
cable length for each AP as shown in Table 7. Summing
all this values results in the total length of cable
required.
This approach is a simplification of reality, however. It
allows for a basic estimation of the required total cable
length when following the listed set of assumptions.
Now that all three variables within the BOM are de-
fined, the TCO can be summarized and structured in 4
major cost groups, CapEx and 3 groups of OpEx costs:
site costs, equipment maintenance, and backhauling, as
shown in Table 8.
All that remains is taking the sum of the different
OpEx costs (Eq. 6), calculating the discounted value of
the total OpEx (Eq. 7), and adding it to the CapEx in
order to obtain the TCO (Eq. 8). Discounting the values
is important as the OpEx costs are spread over multiple
years and the time value of money changes. The corre-
sponding parameters are introduced in Table 9.
cOpExUndiscounted ¼ cOpexOpExSiteCosts
þ cOpexOpExEquipment
þ cOpExbackhauling ð6Þ
cOpEx ¼
XT
t¼0
COpexUndiscounted
1þ rð Þt ð7Þ
TCO ¼ cCapEx þ cOpEx ð8Þ
3.2 Direct and indirect revenue modeling
In the previous section, we looked into the TCO. Now,
we will have a closer look at the relevant revenues.
Table 5 Formula parameters for the total number of required
access points
Parameter Explanation
Nap The number of required APs
u The maximum number of users to be connected
at a single point in time
uAP The number of users supported by a single AP
a The total area to cover
aAP The area covered by a single AP
o Coverage factor [0–100%]
Table 6 Example of an area covered by APs using a 6 × 5 grid,
with a cell size of 25 m
The to-be-covered area with its width (AreaW) and height (AreaH) indicated,
and indication of the location of the APS (x), the location of the switches
(bordered cells)
Table 7 Required length of cable for each AP to be connected
to the closest upload point, with a cell size of 25 m
Spruytte et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking        (2019) 2019:243 Page 7 of 16
Revenues can be categorized in two main categories. On
the one hand, there are direct revenues which result
from the Wi-Fi offer itself (e.g., ad revenues, analysis of
anonymous collected user information, sale of subscrip-
tion tickets, etc.). On the other hand, there are indirect
revenues which result from a positive side effect of the
Wi-Fi network (e.g., people might stay longer and thus
buy more because there is Wi-Fi available). The exact
modeling of both types of revenues requires specific ap-
proaches. One can easily see that the calculation of ad
revenues is different from the calculation of revenue
from subscription tickets. Additionally, as indirect reve-
nues are use case specific, we have chosen to discuss
both direct and indirect revenues in section 4 and not in
a generic way.
4 Results and discussion
In the previous sections, we have shown that on a high
level, the payoff values are composed of revenues and
costs (sections 3.1 and 3.2) and how these can be divided
between both parties (section 3). This leaves us only
with the actual simulation of the game. Before doing so,
we would like to stress that even though a lot of data is
clearly based upon the cost model of Orange, we have
made a set of assumptions to fill in some of the input
values. As assumptions may adversely impact the results,
we have chosen to clearly indicate the quality of each in-
put value. For this, we have used a scale between 1 and
5 as shown in Table 10. For the remainder of the paper,
all tables with input values will have a column quality
which refers to this scale. Do note that the provided in-
put values are assumed for the case at hand and for the
time of writing. This means these assumptions might
not be applicable in a broader scope and that they
should be considered time-sensitive.
In order to demonstrate the game theoretic evaluation of
joint Wi-Fi deployment in a realistic scenario, we have
built a use case using the earlier discussed cost and revenue
models. The setting for this use case is a fictional mall
(based on publicly accessible data from Forum des Halles
in Paris). We consider a venue with an area of 75,000 m2,
an estimated 60,000 visitors during peak hour and a net
revenue of 200 million.2 We estimate 40 million customers
on a yearly basis of which we expect 15% to connect to the
network when a free or freemium network is installed or
2% in case of premium. An overview of the general use
case parameters is provided in Table 11.
In the next sections, we will discuss the different strat-
egies available in the game (section 4.1), followed by the
modeled costs and revenues in sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.3.
4.1 Applying the cost and revenue models to the
shopping mall case
As defined in section 3, we consider 2 players, a MNO
and a VO agreeing to jointly roll-out a Wi-Fi network.
In this game, the MNO chooses which kind of Wi-Fi
network is offered and has 3 pricing options to choose
from: free Wi-Fi (entirely free, no ads), freemium Wi-Fi
(either use the network for free with ads, or pay for a
better and adless experience), or premium (only paid ac-
cess, no ads). These pricing models will directly impact
the number of users that will connect to the network,
and thus the number of APs, switches, and running
meter of cable that will be installed (see section 3.1).
Besides the amount of equipment installed, the different
pricing models do not alter any other technical
parameters.
While the MNO chooses which pricing strategy is ap-
plied, the VO can offer the MNO a cost split, in other
words paying a share of the TCO, ranging from 0 to
100%. As a result, the original payoff formulas (Eqs. 1
and 2) are slightly simplified to their new format as
shown in Eqs. 9 and 10, with the corresponding parame-
ters in Table 12.
2$3000 per square meter was considered a respectable average result in
the USA in 2016; applying this to the use case 75.000m2 × $3000 × 0.9
($/€) = 202.5 million euro; rounded to 200 million. Data retrieved
from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/741804/leading-us-malls-by-
sales-per-square-foot/
Table 8 The entire BOM falls down in 4 major cost groups:
CapEx and 3 sets of OpEx costs (1 year): site costs, equipment
maintenance, and backhauling
Summary Cost Values
Cost Group Cost components Value Amount
cCapEx cCapExAP €1959 Nap
cCapExSwitch €2215 Nswitch
cCapExSubsystemAndCabling €270 Nswitch + 2
cCapExNetworkCable €1 NCable
cCapExFixed €20,509 1
cOpExSiteCosts cOpExSiteCosts €1162 Nap
cOpExEquipment cOpExAP €40.2 Nap
cOpExSwitch €181.9 Nswitch
cOpExFixed €1752.9 1
cOpExbackhauling cOpExBackhauling €1638.9 2
Table 9 Parameters required in order to calculate the
discounted TCO
Parameter Explanation
cOpExUndiscounted Total undiscounted OpEx cost
cOpEx Total discounted OpEx cost
cCapEx Total CapEx cost
TCO Total cost of ownership
T Time horizon of the Wi-Fi network
r Discount rate (%).
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PNMO ¼ DR TCO  1 scð Þ ð9Þ
PVO ¼ IR TCO  sc ð10Þ
4.1.1 Calculating the total cost of ownership (TCO)
In section 3.1, we have introduced two categories within
the equipment cost for the Wi-Fi network: AP-driven
and non-AP-driven. In order to know the required num-
ber of APs, we use Eq. 3 and feed it with the parameters
with the values from Table 13.
This results in a total number of access points (Nap) of
180 for free/freemium and 24 for premium in order to
cover the entire shopping mall. This value we have
linked into the BOM, from which we can deduct the
TCO using Eq. 8; the discount rate and time horizon
were already introduced in Table 11. The resulting cost
values are listed in Table 14. As discussed in section 3.1,
the number of users directly impacts the number of APs
and consequentially the entire BOM. As the premium
priced network attracts fewer users it will thus be
cheaper than the free and freemium priced network.
From Table 14, we can deduct the (discounted) TCO of
the Wi-Fi network which, when taking into account a time
horizon of 4 years, is nearly €1.2 million for a free/free-
mium network and about €200.000 in case of a premium
network. Now that the applicable costs are clear, in the
next section the different revenue streams are modeled.
4.1.2 Modeling direct and indirect revenues per Wi-Fi model
As said earlier, the revenue streams that should be mod-
eled can be categorized in two categories: direct and indir-
ect revenues. These streams are impacted based upon the
chosen Wi-Fi strategy by the MNO as shown in Table 15.
As free and freemium have the same number of users, the
same indirect revenues might be expected, this is however
not the case. We expect freemium to generate (slightly)
less indirect revenues, because an entirely free service (the
free pricing model) is more attractive to attract customers
to the mall than a service with ads or a paid service (the
freemium pricing model). The different revenues streams
are discussed in more detail in the next sections.
4.1.3 Direct revenues: ads and subscription tickets
The direct revenues consist of two components: on the
one hand, there are ad revenues and on the other hand,
subscription tickets. Subscription tickets are only rele-
vant in the paid Wi-Fi models (freemium and premium)
and are sold for different time spans (hour pass, day
pass, year pass (exclusively in premium)). Users who do
not buy a subscription ticket under the freemium model
generate direct revenue in the form of ad revenue. There
are no direct revenues in the free pricing model.
The ad revenue depends upon the total number of
non-paying users in the freemium model (Eq. 11); the
total revenue for the subscription tickets is the sum of
the number of payers per subscription type multiplied
with the cost for a single ticket (Eq. 12). As with the
OpEx costs, discussed in section 3.1, one has to take into
account the time value of money by discounting the
total revenues as shown in Eq. 13 and Eq. 14.
DRads ¼ Cfree U free ð11Þ
DRtickets ¼ ΣCp Up ð12Þ
DRundiscounted ¼ DRads þ DRtickets ð13Þ
DR ¼
XT
t¼0
DRundiscounted
1þ rð Þt ð14Þ
Different numbers of users are expected to buy the dif-
ferent subscription tickets depending upon the chosen
Table 10 Quality scoring overview for the input parameters
Quality Category Explanation
1 Assumption This needs to be improved by
gathering realistic data values.
2 Soft estimate
based on data
Could be improved by constructing
a more elaborate model.
3 Hard estimate
based on data
The data and underlying models are
sufficiently accurate.
4 Derived from the
cost model
Based on a hard estimation of costs
by Orange.
5 Use case
constraint
These values stem directly from the
specifications of the use case (coverage
area, number of visitors, etc.).
Table 11 General use case parameters
Input Explanation Value Quality
a The total area of the shopping mall 75,000 m2 5
Cust Yearly mall visitors 40,000,000 5
CustPeak Visitors during a peak hour 60,000 5
Conn Percentage of customers who connect to
the network
15% (free/freemium)
2% (premium)
5
T Time horizon of the Wi-Fi network 4 5
r Discount rate (%). 10% 4
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Wi-Fi model as summarized in Table 16. The resulting
direct revenue streams are listed in Table 17. Both
models result in about the same direct revenue. This
may seem odd at first; however, do note that as dis-
cussed in the previous section, the TCO for the free-
mium model is about €1.2 million, while the TCO of the
premium model is much lower with about €200.000.
4.1.4 Indirect revenues: side-effects of a public Wi-Fi network
Next to the direct revenues as discussed in the previous
section, we also consider indirect revenues. These do
not stem from the provision of the Wi-Fi network itself
but are a (desired) extra effect. Since indirect revenues
are tied to how attractive users perceive the network,
free Wi-Fi generates more indirect revenue than free-
mium Wi-Fi, which in turn generates more indirect rev-
enue than premium Wi-Fi. A total of 3 different indirect
revenue streams considered. Table 18 lists all the param-
eters which are independent of the chosen Wi-Fi model,
while Table 19 lists the dependent ones
 Increase of customers (IDRcustomers). Offering Wi-Fi
to users makes the shopping mall more attractive to
enter.
IDRcustomers ¼ Custincr  Sales ð15Þ
 Increase of shopping time (IDRtime). Customers
enjoying the Wi-Fi stay longer at the shopping mall.
uy ¼ Cust  Conn ð16Þ
IDRtime ¼ uy  tincr  Saleshourly ð17Þ
 Increase of sales due to more exposure to ads in the
shopping mall (IDRads). Longer exposure to ads
means more likely people are affected by it.
IDRads ¼ uy  Sales  Salesincr ð18Þ
All of these indirect revenues are a benefit for the
shops within the mall but not directly for the VO; how-
ever, we assume the VO manages to reap a part (10%) of
these benefits because the venue becomes more interest-
ing from a business perspective allowing for higher ren-
tal prices. This is shown in Eq. 19; as before, again the
revenues are discounted to take into account the time
value of money. The resulting values are provided in
Table 20.
IDRundiscounted ¼ IDRcustomers þ IDRtime þ IDRadsð Þ
 IDRpercentage
ð19Þ
IDR ¼
XT
t¼0
IDRundiscounted
1þ rð Þt ð20Þ
4.2 Initial version of the game
Now all costs and revenues have received their value for
the use case at hand, it is time to incorporate these in
the payoff matrix and combine these correctly with the
different strategies of the MNO and the VO. Just a small
reminder about the strategies and the game at hand: in
the initial version of this game, the MNO chooses how
the Wi-Fi-offer will be proposed to the end-user (free,
freemium, or premium) while receiving 100% of the dir-
ect revenues. The VO receives the indirect revenues and
Table 12 High-level parameters used in the payoff functions of
the cooperative game
Parameter Explanation
PMNO Payoff network operator
PVO Payoff venue owner
DR Total direct revenue
IR Total indirect revenue
TCO Total cost of ownership (CapEx + OpEx)
sc Cost split [0–100%], proposed by the VO
Table 13 Formula parameters for the total number of required access points
Parameter Explanation Value Quality
u The maximum number of users to be connected at
a single point in timea
9000 (free/freemium)1200 (premium) 5
uAP The number of users supported by a single AP 50 5
a The total area of the shopping mall 75,000 m2 5
o Coverage factor 100% 3
aAP The area covered by a single AP 9503 m
2 (a circle with a radius of 55 m) 5
a15% (free/freemium) or 2% (premium) users connect multiplied by the number of users at peak hour (CustPeak)
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offers to pay a part of the total cost of the network, ran-
ging from 0 to 100%.3 We are modeling the interaction
between both players as a parallel game; this means both
players choose a strategy at the same time, unaware of
the other player’s strategy.
When simulating the entire game, it results in a game
matrix as shown in Table 21 (for information on how to
interpret this matrix, see section 3). Within this matrix,
a number of cells have been emphasized: the cells with
thick borders represent Pareto optimal solutions and the
cell in bold and underlined is the single Nash equilib-
rium. The cells between 20 and 80% have been removed
for brevity, as these follow the same pattern (free and
freemium are Pareto, no Nash equilibria are present). In
order to calculate Nash and Pareto equilibria, we have
applied their definitions as originally defined in [31, 32].
A Nash equilibrium can be defined as follows: it is a
stable state in which no participants can gain by a
change of strategy as long as all the other participants’
strategies remain unchanged. By iterating every cell, we
can determine per player individually whether a change
of strategy can lead to a better payoff. If no change in
strategy of any player can lead to an improvement, the
cell is a Nash equilibrium. Doing this for the matrix in
Table 21, we see that only for a single cell (the one in
the bottom left) none of the players can improve itself
by changing only its own strategy. Take for example the
cell in the top left (− 1.16, 2.06) we can see that the
MNO can improve its payoff from − 1.16 to 8.33 by
changing its strategy, making the top left cell not a Nash
equilibrium.
Similarly, a Pareto optimal state is a stable state in
which no player can improve its payoff without decreas-
ing the payoff of another player. Formulated differently,
we say a cell is Pareto dominated if another cell exists
which is as good for all players but strictly better for at
least one of the players.4 If a cell is not Pareto dominated
it is Pareto optimal. By iterating each cell and comparing
it with all others, we can validate which cells are Pareto.
Taking back the same two examples as before: The bot-
tom left cell (8.33, 0.06) is not Pareto as it is dominated
by the cell in the middle right (8.63, 0.23) which is even
better for both players. The top left cell (− 1.16, 2.06) is
Pareto, because no other cell is as good for both players
and at least better for one of the players. While both ad-
jacent cells are better for one of the players, they are
worse for the other one. These cells are thus not domin-
ating the top left cell. This same reasoning goes for all
other cells, making the top left cell Pareto.
When looking at these results, two things should be
indicated:
1. The total payoff of each cell (in millions) within a
row is identical5: free (0.9), freemium (8.7), and
premium (8.36).
2. The Nash equilibrium is not Pareto.
From an outsider’s perspective, we can clearly say the
Nash equilibrium, the solution that is expected to arise
in a market economy, is clearly not the highest yielding
set of solutions: from a total payoff point of view, free-
mium scores better. In more technical terms: the Nash
equilibrium is not Pareto optimal because it is Pareto
dominated by the multiple combinations (e.g., freemium,
100%).
4.3 Adapted version of the game: the introduction of a
compensation scheme
Since the total payoff of freemium is highest of all, in
other words a freemium solution will yield the highest
benefit for both players combined, such a solution is to
be preferred from an outsider’s perspective. As the total
outcome of the freemium model is larger than the total
3This implies a continuous strategy space; however, for the ease of
representing the results, we have chosen to discretize the strategies
after checking this did not alter the outcome of the game.
4In games in which the payoff values have a limited number of
possible values, it is possible for two cells to have the same outcome
for a player, resulting in the player not having a preference for either.
This is not the case in this game.
5When looking at the full numbers; within the matrix only rounded
numbers are provided for brevity, so minor deviations are possible.
Table 14 The total cost of ownership calculation shows a cost of over one million euro for a free/freemium Wi-Fi roll-out and two
hundred thousand euro for premium
Parameter Explanation Value freemium Value premium
cCapEx Total CapEx cost €397,399 €81,855
cOpExSiteCosts OpEx for site costs of the APs per year (undiscounted) €209,160 €27,888
cOpExEquipment OpEx for all non-AP equipment per year (undiscounted) €10,444.1 €3445.30
cOpExbackhauling OpEx for backhauling per year (undiscounted) €3278 €3278
cOpEx Total discounted OpEx cost (for 4 years) €766,481 €34,611.3
TCO Discounted total cost Of ownership (for 4 years) €1,163,880 €200,883
Spruytte et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking        (2019) 2019:243 Page 11 of 16
Table 16 Direct revenue parameters for the freemium and premium model
Parameter Explanation Value freemium Value premium Quality
Cfree Number of users not paying and generating revenue via ads 5,280,000 0 1
Ufree Ads revenue per user €0.1 0 1
Cp Number of customers for hour, day or year pass / / /
Up Unit revenue for type of pass, p ∈ (hour, day, year) / / /
Chour Number of customers for hour pass 540,000 720,000 3
Uhour Unit revenue for an hour pass €2 €2 3
Cday Number of customers for day pass 180,000 48,000 2
Uday Unit revenue for a day pass €5 €5 2
Cyear Number of customers for year pass 0 32,000 2
Uyear Unit revenue for a year pass 0 €25 2
Table 15 The chosen Wi-Fi strategy by the MNO impacts the direct and indirect revenue streams
Wi-Fi model Direct revenue Expected number of
connecting visitors
Expected indirect revenue
Free None 15% Highest
Freemium Ads + subscription tickets 15% Lower
Premium Subscription tickets 2% Lowest
Table 17 Generated direct revenues for the freemium and premium Wi-Fi model as calculated by Eqs. 11–14
Parameter Explanation Freemium Premium
DRads Undiscounted revenue from ads per year €528,000 0
DRtickets Undiscounted revenue from subscription tickets per year €1,980,000 €2,480,000
DRundiscounted Total undiscounted direct revenue per year €2,508,000 €2,480,000
DR Total discounted revenues (for 4 years) €8,625,012 €8,528,720
Table 18 Indirect revenue parameters shared for all three Wi-Fi models
Parameter Explanation Value Quality
Sales Yearly total revenue of the mall €240,000,000 5
Cust Yearly mall visitors 40,000,000 5
Saleshourly Hourly net revenue gained from customers who spend longer time inside due to Wi-Fi
a 8 1
tincr Time that a Wi-Fi user spends longer in the mall (compared to non-users) 15 min 1
Salesincr The increase of sales due to more exposure to ads in the shopping mall 3% 5
aUnderlying reasoning: people might stay a little longer in the mall (15 min), e.g., to look up where to go next, while drinking a coffee worth 2 euro
Table 19 Indirect revenue parameters with distinct values for all three Wi-Fi models
Parameter Explanation Value free Value freemium Value premium Quality
CustIncr Increase of customers due to availability of Wi-Fi 2% 1% 0% 5
Conn Percentage of customers who connect to the network 15% 15% 2% 5
uy The number of users that connect to the network per year 6,000,000 6,000,000 120,000 5
Spruytte et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking        (2019) 2019:243 Page 12 of 16
outcome of the premium model, a redistribution of the
payoffs between both actors is possible.
The redistribution is as follows: the VO proposes
next to taking over a part of the TCO (just as before)
to pay an additional fee equal to a percentage of the
premium profits. This way, the MNO receives the en-
tire direct revenues of the freemium model and a part
of what would have been earned if chosen for the
premium model.
Which compensation percentages could work can
be determined from Fig. 1; in this figure, we have
plotted the difference in profit for the MNO and VO
when compared to the premium model (positive
means more profit). The interesting area in this figure
is where both lines are positive, meaning both actors
will thus obtain more profit from the freemium
model than the premium model. This implies that the
VO can convince the MNO to choose for a freemium
solution if he offers at least 10.5% additional compen-
sation (10.5% of the total revenues in the premium
model). Additionally, the VO cannot (should not)
offer more than 14% compensation, as that would
make paying the compensation to end up in the free-
mium model less interesting than the premium model
from his point of view.
In this figure, we assume a cost sharing of 0% is con-
sidered, the range of possible compensation percentages
will obviously differ at other cost sharing percentage:
higher cost sharing means less profit for the VO,
meaning less profit which can be used for compensation.
Since the Nash equilibrium is situated at 0% cost shar-
ing, discussing compensation at other percentages than
0% in details yields no additional knowledge.
As any percentage between 10.5 and 14% will yield the
desired effect, we have chosen arbitrarily to use 11%.
The proposed changes in the game have been visualized
in Table 22; the first strategy of the VO (0% cost share)
is extended to 0% cost share + 11% compensation; 11%
of the revenues of the premium model is equal to 0.949
million (the direct and indirect revenues were discussed
in Table 17 and Table 20). All 11 strategies of the mall
owner (0–100% in 10% increments) can be adapted to
include the proposed compensation scheme.
This kind of adaption to the game reflects to negotia-
tions between MNO and VO in real life, e.g., the MNO
could state “We can agree with a Freemium pricing
model, as long as it generates us as much profit as a Pre-
mium pricing strategy”. It is then up to the VO to see
whether and how this is possible. In this case, we have
chosen to work out an additional compensation as a per-
centage of the premium revenue; absolute compensations
or other cost sharing strategies would be possible as well.
When recalculating the game with these newly proposed
strategies, we see the single Nash equilibrium has moved
up to the freemium row; this way, the expected outcome
of the game (Nash) corresponds with a Pareto optimal so-
lution. In other words, the game has effectively been
steered to the optimal solution, which was the original
Table 20 Indirect revenue streams for different Wi-Fi models
Parameter Explanation Value free Value freemium Value premium
IDRcustomer Undiscounted revenue by increase in customers per year €4,800,000 €2,400,000 0
IDRtime Undiscounted revenue by increased sales longer time spent in mall per year €120,000 €120,000 €16,000
IDRads Undiscounted revenue by increased sales through targeted ads per year €1,080,000 €1,080,000 €144,000
IDRpercentage Percentage of the estimated revenues the venue owner can charge. 10% 10% 10%
IDRundiscounted Total indirect revenues per year €600,000 €360,000 €16,000
IDR Total discounted indirect revenues (for 4 years) €2,063,400 €1,238,040 €55,024
Table 21 Extract of the matrix of the initial game, expressed in million: bordered cells are Pareto, bold underlined cells are Nash
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intent. The adapted outcome of the game is provided in
Table 23; the cells between 0 and 80% have been removed
for brevity, as these follow the same pattern (free and free-
mium are Pareto, no Nash equilibria are present).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated how to model
the interactions between a MNO and a VO in a two-
player non-cooperative non-zero-sum game with the
goal of deploying a public Wi-Fi network. For this we
have modeled both the cost of the deployment of the
Wi-Fi network (CapEx and OpEx) as well as the dir-
ect and indirect revenues. For the cost information,
we have used a simplified version of a cost model
provided by Orange, where the number of users con-
necting to the Wi-Fi network and the coverage area
are the main cost drivers.
The considered use case describes the deployment of
public Wi-Fi in a shopping mall in which the MNO
chooses a business model (free, freemium, premium),
while the VO (in this case, the shopping mall owner)
proposes to take over a part of the network cost (0–
100%). Starting from this game, we have seen that the
expected outcome of the game is a premium Wi-Fi of-
fering, a solution which is not Pareto optimal. However,
when modeling the outcome of expected negotiations
between MNO and VO in real life, we end up with a
situation where the VO pays a compensation to the
MNO to choose a freemium Wi-Fi solution. By agreeing
to this compensation, the payoff of the MNO becomes
as good for freemium as for premium, while in the
meantime the VO manages to increase his payoff even
when paying the compensation. This way, the game ends
up in a solution which is both Pareto optimal and a
Nash equilibrium.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the method-
ology of how to model the outcome of a collaborative
public Wi-Fi deployment, not to give an exact economic
Table 22 Example of how the new strategies of the MNO might look
Fig. 1 Effect of different compensation percentages when comparing the profit of the MNO with the premium model. The interesting area is
where both lines are positive, meaning both actors will obtain more profit from the freemium model than the premium model. This implies that
the VO can convince the MNO to choose for a freemium solution if he offers at least 10.5% additional compensation (10.5% of the total revenues
in the premium model)
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prediction of a real-life use case. We have proposed a
methodological approach for modeling costs and reve-
nues that is general enough to remain valid with differ-
ent input values. However, the actual outcome of the
model is highly sensitive to the input data. In order to
make reliable predictions about real-life use cases, one
needs to obtain reliable input values through market re-
search and analysis of the technical constraints of the
specific use case at hand. In the case of municipal Wi-Fi,
both the willingness to pay and the corresponding num-
ber of paying customers, as well as the indirect benefits
from the network itself should be well researched or
modeled, e.g., by constructing a more detailed bottom-
up model of such benefits [33].
Multiple tracks are possible for future work: a first
step could be to further refine the models by including
more technical details. We currently do not assume that
data offloading has a large impact on a mobile network
operator’s revenue in enclosed areas such as the shop-
ping malls. Adding the indirect effects of data offloading
might change the network operator’s outcome, for better
or worse. On the one hand, offloading decongests the
cellular network, but on the other hand, the network op-
erator might lose revenue when subscribers choose to
transmit their mobile data over a Wi-Fi network instead
of the cellular network.
Additionally, femtocells could be added in this com-
parison as these also help in decongesting the network
and do not have the risk of reducing the mobile reve-
nues; in such a case, the comparison between Wi-Fi and
femtocells could be made. Other technical parameters
such as the location of APs could be included.
Next to a more thorough technical modeling, a validation
of the input values could be interesting. This could either
be performed using a sensitivity analysis, testing the impact
of, e.g., the number of concurrent users and the cost of spe-
cific equipment. Another approach could be constructing a
methodological framework which allows companies to
make qualified estimates of the considered input values.
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